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1.  Introduction 
Dynamic semantic  accounts  of  presupposition  have proven  to  quite  successful  im- 
provements over earlier theories. One great advance has been to link presupposition 
and anaphora together (van der Sandt 92, Geurts 95), an approach that extends to inte- 
grate bridging and other discourse phenomena (Asher and Lascarides !998a,b). In this 
extended anaphoric account, presuppositions attach, like assertions, to the discourse 
context via certain rhetorical relations. These discourse attachments constrain accom- 
modation and help avoid some infelicitous predictions of standard accounts of presup- 
position. Further, they have interesting and complex interactions with underspecified 
conditions that  are an  important feature of  the contributions of  most presupposition 
triggers. 
Deictic uses of definites, on the other hand, seem at first glance to fall outside the 
purview of an anaphoric theory of presupposition. There seems to be little that a dis- 
course based theory would have to say. I will argue, however, that a discourse based 
account can capture how  these definites function in  conversation. In particular such 
accounts  can  clarify the  interaction  between  the  uses  of  such  deictic definites  and 
various conversational moves. At least some deictic uses of definites generate presup- 
positions that are bound to the context via a rhetorical function that I'll call unchoring, 
which  if  successful entails a type of knowing how. If  this anchoring function is ac- 
cepted, then  the  acceptors  know  how  to  locate the  referent  of  the  definite  in  the 
pres?'lent context. I'll concentrate here just on definites that refer to spatial locations, 
where the intuitions about anchoring are quite clear. But I think that this view extends 
to other deictic uses of definites and has ramifications for an analysis of de re atti- 
tudes as well. 
2.  Different ways to bind presuppositions 
To set the stage for an analysis of  anchoring uses of  definites and the role that their 
presuppositions play there, it is useful to see how varied a role presuppositions of de- 
finites  play  in  anaphoric  uses  of  definites.  According  to  "Dynamic"  accounts  like 
Heim's fhrniliurity  theory (1982), definites presuppose familiar discourse referents. 
Such presuppositions must he satisfied in  the discourse context in the Tarskian sense 
or must be accommodated (i.e., added) to the discourse context. Van der Sandt (1993) 
tells us to find these discourse referents via anaphora resolution -  i.e., try to bind, and 
failing that, accommodate. Geurts extends this view by  including propositional iden- 
tity as a means of binding. 
Nevertheless, there is much more that can be said about binding. Consider bridging 
examples like the following: 
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(1)  a.  I met two interesting people last night at a party. 
b.  The woman was a member of Clinton's Cabinet. 
(2)  a.  John took engine El  from Avon to Dansville. 
b.  Then he picked up the boxcar 
c.  and took it to Broxburn. 
Now what happens to the presuppositions generated by  the boxcar in (2b)? On stan- 
dard accounts, we can't bind the boxcar to any discourse entity in the context nor can 
we satisfy the presupposition that there is a boxcar in the discourse context created by 
the first sentence. So all  the standard theories of  presupposition  would  say that we 
should accommodate a boxcar in the context. This misses an  important aspect of the 
meaning in  this discourse, which we can focus on by asking ourselves: Where ist the 
boxcar? The discourse based account in Asher and Lascarides (1998a) gets this essen- 
tial part of the interpretation of (2) by assuming that the presuppositional material in- 
troduced  by  the definite contains some underspecified elements,  while the bridging 
relation is set to identity if  this produces a well-defined result (thus incorporating the 
insights by  van der Sandt that binding is preferred), but in  this case there is no non- 
absurd identification of  the boxcar with some other discourse entity to be had. How- 
ever,  in  (2b),  there  is  a  discourse particle  or  adverbial  then  that  determines  the 
discourse relation between (2a) and (2b) to be one of Narration. The presence of such a 
discourse  relation  between  (2a) and  (2b)  entails  that  the  event described  in  (2b)  is 
understood  as coming after the event described in  (2a) and as spatially located in the 
location in which the event in (2a) terminates (Dansville). The lexical semantics of pick 
up  adds the information that in effect the boxcar is in Dansville. This suffices to de- 
termine  the  bridging  relation  in  this  case to  be  'in'.  Thus, the boxcar  is  linked to 
Dansville and that is enough to get the right interpretation. Details of the analysis can 
be found in Asher and Lascarides (1998a). 
With  (I), we  also see a need to  supplement  both  the Heim  and van  der Sandt- 
Geurts approaches to presupposition. Again we can't bind the woman to any discourse 
entity in the context nor can we satisfy the presupposition that there is a woman in the 
discourse context created by the first sentence. So all the standard theories of presup- 
position  would say that  we should accommodate a woman  in  the context. But this 
again misses an essential component of the interpretation of  (I): the woman is one of 
the two people that I met last night. The discourse based  anaphoric account gets this 
essential part  of  the interpretation of (1) by a simultaneous resolution of  the under- 
specified bridging and a computation of  the discourse connections between  the pre- 
supposition  generated  by  the woman, the  asserted  component  of  (Ib) and  (la) ac- 
counts for this anaphoric connection and the coherence of the text. More specifically, 
in  this case again, specifying the bridging relation to identity yields an absurdity. But 
if  we specify the bridging relation to be "an  element of', we get a coherent discourse 
and a discourse relation of  elaboration between (la) and (lb). Alternatively, specify- 
ing the discourse relation  to be Elaboration will  coerce the underspecified bridging 
relation to the appropriate value.' 
Other examples of  complex presupposition binding occur when the presupposition 
trigger, the expression that generates the presupposition, is itself a discourse particle. 
That is the case with (3): 
'  Scc Asher and Lascarides (1998a) for mure details, and also section 4 helow 
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(3)  John lives in New York too 
Kripke in  an  unpublished paper observes that (3) can't be  uttered in a null context, 
even if  many people  are known  by the speaker and the audience to live in NY. But 
accounts like van  der Sandt's and Heim's  don't  predict this.  On the other hand, the 
discourse based  account can, of  we assume that the presupposition  of  too is that  it 
generates a specific rhetorical function connecting the assserted content of  (3) to some 
element of  the contextually  given discourse  structure. In  the null  context there is no 
element of  discourse structure to connect to, and so the presupposition of  too can't be 
fulfilled. 
A  Final  example of  binding with  rhetorical  relations  reveals that not only are the 
Heim-  van der Sandt -  Geurts accounts of presupposition incomplete but they derive 
wrong interpretations. Consider (4). 
(4)  a.  If  a farmer goes to the market, he buys a donkey. 
b.  Yesterday, Farmer John went to the market. 
c.  The donkey he bought was expensive. 
d.  This time the donkey was expensive 
e.  This time (?)itdunkey  was expensive. 
Van  der Sandt and Geurts must accommodate the existence of  a donkey in order to 
interpret the presupposition of (4c,d,e). But the donkey in (4) depends on an anaphoric 
link  between  bought  and  went.  Accommodation  yields  incorrect  results.  Heim's 
(1983) theory yields only the satisfaction of an existential presupposition, not an ana- 
phoric one. We need an appropriate instantiation of the conditional (like (4a')) 
(4)  a'  If John is a farmer and went to market, John bought a donkey 
which, when coupled with (4b), gives the donkey referred to in (4c). 
(5)  If  a farmer goes to Paris, he buys a donkey 
Pedro went to Paris. His donkey was expensive 
(6)  A Farmer buys a donkey whenever he visits the market. 
Farmer John visits the market on Wednesdays. His donkeys are meny 
Similarly, for (4) adding an argument for going-to-the-nzarket events. We might call 
this  inferential  binding.  The inferential  binding  in  (4abc) falls  squarely within  the 
analysis given to the bridging examples and to our anaphoric theory of presupposi- 
tions. The rhetorical relation that binds the presupposition to the discourse context is 
the relation of Defeasible Consequence (Asher and Lascarides  1998b), a natural gen- 
eralization of Geurts's notion of propositional binding. Defeasible Consequence holds 
of two propositions p, q iff q is a defeasible consequence of p.'  This relation will bind 
the presupposition to both (4a) and (4b) as both are necessary to derive the presuppo- 
sition that Pedro owns a donkey. 
Defeasible consequence  is  defined  precisely  via a  n~~nmonotonic  logic. See for instance Lascarides 
and Asher 1993, or Asher and Morreau  199  1 Nicholas Asher 
In  these examples, however, we cannot specify the bridging relation to identity. So the 
semantics of the rhetorical relation used to bind the presupposition must determine the 
bridging relation. In these examples the bridging relation ia  set to a witnessing relation 
W. While one term of W should be the discourse referent introduced by the definite, it 
is  less  clear  what  the  other  term  should  be.  If  we  allow  reference  to  quantifiers 
themselves or their logical forms (it is after all  one type of abstract object), then we 
can  take the other term of W to be the quantifier of which the definite produces an 
instance. In  (4), the appropriate quantifier is a donkey in (4a). 
3.  "Deictic binding" and Discourse Function 
Not  all  uses  of  definite  descriptions  fit  so  neatly  into  an  anaphoric  theory  of 
presupposition. Definite descriptions  have deictic uses  within  ordinary  conversation. 
Let's take some simple examples: 
(7)  a.  Now pour the mixture into the pan and gently simmer for 10 mins. 
b.  Move the window to the lower left (on a computer screen). 
c.  Close the window in the bedroom. 
d.  You've just  checked into a hotel and the clerk says: Your room is up the 
stairs and right at the end of the corridor. 
Many of these definites occur in contexts where, e.g., a window on the computer screen 
has already been introduced in  a previous discourse turn. So the presupposition would 
be satisfied here by  linking the discourse referents  introduced by the two NPs. On the 
other hand, this  mere anaphoric connection  isn't  sufficient to carry out the convcrsa- 
tional purpose behind these instructions. In order, for example, to carry out the instruc- 
tion  in (7d), the addressee need to be able to find the referent of the description. Simi- 
larly for (7a,c). The discourse referents introduced by the definites have to be linked or 
anchored to particular  nonlinguistic  elements in the visual  nonlinguistic context. The 
case in  (7d) is a hit  different, but  in  a way  it's  more interesting. The definites your 
room, the corridor have a standard anaphoric analysis but the stairs is somewhat differ- 
ent. We could simply accommodate that there is a corridor on an anaphoric account, but 
we would miss the intended interpretation -  viz, that the stairs be linked to some object 
in  the environment that accomplishes the manifest goal of the speaker, which is that the 
addressee knows how to get to his room. As one would expect, a standard, dynamic ac- 
count of  presupposition, which treats  the presupposition  of  the definite  in (7d) simply 
by  adding it to the context, misses the rhetorical point of the speaker. 
This rhetorical  function of  the presupposition for the speaker in  a given context is 
part  of  what determines conversation. Consider  what  happens  when  this  rhetorical 
function isn't shared by the interpreter or addressee. If  the addressee cannot locate the 
stairs, for instance, it is quite appropriate for him to say: 
(7)  d'.  Where are the stairs? 
We saw earlier that  the presupposition  of  a definite description when  resolved can 
help determine a rhetorical  function for the asserted content of a sentence (viz. (lb)), 
and it seems as though the presupposed material here too has an imprtant role to play 
in this rhetorical function. But what exactly does it do? Nicholas Asher 
are uses of definites that could be bound via identity to a previously mentioned occur- 
rence as in: 
(8f,ii)  P:  Tu as pris sous la voie ferrCe comme je t'avais dit? 
But interestingly Isabelle does not use this binding alone. In order to be able to answer 
the question, she must be  able to identify the railroad tracks in her immediate envi- 
ronment or as something she passed on her journey. She has to "anchor"  the definite 
to some object in the (nonlinguistic) context. To that end, she offers up an object in 
her perceptual context with which to bind la voie ferrie. 
(8g)  I:  D'ici on voit une voie ferrie, an dessus de la place 
Interestingly again, Phillippe rejects this contextual anchoring  of  the railroad tracks 
in (8h); he identifies  what she sees as the Boulevard Peripherique. So it looks like 
deictically used definites do generate familiarity presuppositions; further the satisfac- 
tion of the presupposition is accomplished by linking the definite to some object in the 
nonlinguistic context. Finally, it appears that an upshot of this linking is a mutual be- 
lief that both participants in the dialogue are referring to the same object with the de- 
scription. When this doesn't happen, we get a Correction or some sort of question by 
the other participants, as Phillippe does in (8h). 
Exactly what  is the nature of this Anchoring  ? It's  easy enough to see that it in- 
volves some sort of de re attitude toward the object, but just  saying this doesn't illu- 
minate  an  important  link between  Anchoring  of  a definite  in an utterance and the 
conversational goals of the utterance or of utterances linked to it. Consider 
(8e,i)  I:  Non, en fait, je suis tout an bout de I 'avenue Jean Jaurks. apr&s  la grande 
place. 
au bout de l'avenue Jeun Juur2s is a definite with a novel use. In another context ac- 
commodation  might suffice, but not here with the particular conversational goals of 
finding out where Isabelle is. Or perhaps, the location denoted by the end of the ave- 
nue Jeun Juurds  could be bound to some doxastically accessible discourse referent, 
since Phillippe  lived  in  that  neighborhood.  But  in  Phillippe's  response  to Isabelle 
(8f.i), he makes it clear that this binding isn't sufficient for him to attain his speech act 
related goal of knowing where Isabelle is. In  order to satisfy his conversational goals 
he  needs  a contextual  anchoring that  will  support a de  re  knowledge claim. What 
would suffice is a binding of the presupposed location to some location that he is fa- 
miliar with  and can  locate on his "cognitive  map".  And in fact this is what Isabelle 
wants to do too in view of the goal they both have of getting Isabelle unlost. 
That Anchoring  must be done in order to achieve the conversational goals is also 
well-attested  in  the  map corpus dialogues  (Edinburgh University). I give a sample 
here. 
(10)  a.  A: Start at the extinct volcano, and go down round the tribal settlement. 
And then 
b.  B: Whereabouts is the tribal settlement? 
c.  A:  It's at the bottom. It's to the left of the extinct volcano. 
d.  B:  Right. How far? Deixis, Binding and Presupposition 
Ehm, at the opposite side. 
To the opposite side. Is it underneath the rope bridge or to the left. 
It's underneath the rope bridge.  And  then  from the tribal  settle- 
ment go straight up towards  the rope  bridge  and  over the rope 
bridge. Then down three steps and along to above the volcano. 
Is down three steps below or above the machete'? 
Ah. The machete's not on my map. 
Oh. 
Down three lines. 
Right. 
And then along as far as the volcano but above it, and stop under- 
neath the collapsed shelter but away from it a bit, 
Right. 
And go up to about the middle of the map. 
The middle of the map. 
And stop. 
Just slightly above the crevasse? 
That's  not  on  my  map either.  Ehm, go to  your  left  again  into 
about the middle. 
I think that would bring me over the crevasse. 
Well, it's not on my map. 
No? Oh. 
In the MAP Task Corpus dialogues, agent A  is trying to get B  to a given goal in a 
game, in  which  both  A  and  B  have a partially  accurate map  of  the terrain  to be 
traversed. In  this dialogue the instructions to move to a particular place can only be 
carried out once either that place or obstacles to be circumvented have been anchored 
in an appropriate way to their maps. When this Anchoring doesn't take place, then the 
agents can't give or carry out directions and they have to settle on  another means for 
conveying directions. The directions can  only be carried out once the locations  in- 
volved are appropriately anchored. 
I want to draw several  conclusions from  the discussion of  these examples. First, 
like other uses of definites, deictically used definites do generate familiarity presuppo- 
sitions. Second these presuppositions are not accommodated or bound in the way fa- 
miliar from standard, anaphoric theories of presupposition. But that doesn't mean that 
we have to throw out the machinery of  the  anaphoric theory. In  fact, the discourse 
based anaphoric theory of  presuppositions is very useful: we can understand contex- 
tual anchoring as a special sort of presupposition binding; in fact contextual anchoring 
is a rhetorical function of the presupposed information in these deictic cases. For the 
discourse to be felicitous, the presupposition generated by  a deictically used definite 
must be tied to some object in  the nonlinguistic context such that the interpreter be- 
lieves he knows how to identify it or make use of  that object for some conversation- 
ally  salient, discourse purpose. The upshot of  such anchoring is a mutual  belief  be- 
tween  speaker and hearer that they are referring to the same object with the descrip- 
tion. When this doesn't happen, we get a Correction or some sort of question by the 
other participants, as Phillippe does in (8h), and as Isabelle does in (8m). 
Phillippes goal is to get de re knowledge, to know where Isabelle is. But this goal 
itself  is  subservient  to  another  goal  namely  that  of  getting  Isabelle  unlost.  Let's 
assume for now that Phillippe has acquired this goal. and it  is this higher goal that Nicholas Asher 
tells us what sort of de re knowledge this really is; Phillippe needs to know  where 
Isabelle is so that he can give her directions to get her to her destination. And to give 
these  directions he  has  to  construct  a path  from  Isabelle's  present  location  to her 
destination  and  to  do that  he  has  to  be  able to  fix  the  present  location  (and  her 
destination)  on  some cognitive  map; or perhaps  more  simply he  has  to know  how 
himself  to  get  from  where  she is  to  where  she wants to go. So this  de  re claimis 
grounded in  a plan  and finally  in a capacity for  actin. It's  not  knowledge thut that's 
indicative or even constitutive of  de re attitude claims; it's  knowing how to realize a 
cerain  goal.  Boer  and  Lycan  (1986)  propose  that  de  re  knowledge  be  understood 
relative to purposes. I take their proposal to be basically correct. But they still analyze 
de re attitudes in light of  knowledge that -  viz. knowledge of  a proposition containing 
an attributive description. and while this is sometimes the case, it need not be; in the 
map task  it may be  the ability to point to a loction  or to put an agent  in a particular 
location that constitutes knowledge de re of that location. Boer and Lycan are interested 
in stopping the "regress"  of  "who is X?" type questions. But in  so doing they conflate 
the issue of  de re knowledge claims with their justification. De re knowledge is just  a 
matter  of  having  access  to  the  object  that  is  sufficient  for  accomplishing  the 
contextually given goals at hand. The upshot of  our proposal  for contextual anchoring 
amounts  to  the  following  view  of  de  re  attitude:  there  isn't  any  ahsolute  de  re 
knowledge; there's de re knowledge relative to various goals that one might have. 
3.1  Previous approaches to Contextual Anchoring 
The description given of the phenomenon of contextual anchoring of the presuppposi- 
tions  of  definites is  a  quite different picture of  deictically used  definites than  that 
found  in  the philosophical  and  linguistic literature. Here are some approaches that 
might be useful to combine with the Boer and Lycan analysis of de re attitudes I  have 
sketched above. 
contextual evaluations for indexicals and demonstratives (Kaplan 1978) 
value loading (Barwise and Perry 1983) 
DRT's external and internal anchors (e.g., Asher 1986) 
Each one of these theories gives us an account of the satisfaction of the definites. Both 
Kaplan and Barwise and Perry suggest that a definite may be evaluated in the present 
context  or for Barwise  and  Perry  in  any  "conversationally  salient"  situation.  This 
"value  loading",  or "externalist"  type of evaluation yields a singular proposition for 
the  sentence containing the definite.  Such an  account  yields  a connection  between 
deictically used definites and de re attitudes, which seems needed  to account for the 
rhetorical  function of  such definites. Once an agent accepts such a singular proposition 
or comes to believe it, he has a de re believe. 
The problem is that this act of acceptance and the de re attitude as an attitude toward 
a  singular proposition  doesn't  by  itself  link  up easily  to  the  conversational  patterns 
we've already discussed. Consider again the position  of  Phillippe  in (8f.i). Suppose 
that he accepts Isabelle's  assertion whose interpretation yields a singular proposition. 
By accepting this assertion, he comes to have a belief, in this case a de re belief. But 
on the other hand, we'd like to distinguish this case from the sort of attitude that Phil- 
lippe requires  in  order to  satisfy his conversational goals. For instance, in  (Ei), it's 
clear from his response that Phillippe doesn't huve access to that contextual evalua- Deixis, Binding and Presupposition 
tion, which is something that these approaches can't explain. And this lack of access 
drives his response to Isabelle's  assertion, and in particular her use of the definite uu 
bout de ['avenue Jean Juuris. 
An  alternative,  "internalist"  approach  to  singular  propositions  and  the  attendant 
construal  of  de re  attitudes  is  to  look  for  some internal,  cognitive  aspect  of  these 
attitudes.  This  is also a familiar  idea in  philosophy, also made famous by  Kaplan - 
though this time it's Kaplan's (1968) paper  'Quantifying  in'. Kaplan's idea was that a 
de re attitude involves a particular sort of name, a "vivid name", for the object and that 
name as a constituent of the attitude object. Vivid names for a particular attitude holder 
are  ones  that  have  a  lot  of  information  assocjated  with  them,  perhaps  information 
suficient to identify the object. But, at least on this construal, vividness isn't  necessary 
for some de re knowledge claims. Knowledge who, for instance, is presumbaly a kind 
of  de re attitude. So now consider the de re knolwedge involved in knowing who lost 
the battle of Hastings for the purposes of a history exam. Here the name of a long dead 
Anglo Saxon king will suffice; what seems important in  this case is not the amount of 
information as the disposal of the possessor of the attitude but the way that information 
interacts  with  the conversational  goals at hand.  The practical  activity in  the example 
about King Harold is just being able to supply the correct answer. We could reconstme 
vividness in terms of  knowing how, but we would still need to supplement this with an 
account of how this attitude toward the referent of the definite interacts with discourse. 
And we lack here any connection with accounts of presupposition. 
A DRT approach to deictically used definites could make use both of internalist and 
externalist components. In  the terminology of  Asher (1986) (see also Kamp  1987), a 
DRT approach to deictically used definites could make use both of external anchors to 
simulate the  truth conditional  effects of singular propositions  and  of  internal  anchors 
that  could  furnish  additional  descriptive  conditions.  The  definite  would  introduce  a 
discourse referent x that would be linked to some object a in the context via an external 
anchor, which  would ensure that the satisfaction of  the discourse representation must 
proceed by  assigning a to x. Additionally, the binding of  the presupposition generated 
by the definite could take place via an internal anchoring of x to some discourse referent 
in  a representation that is part of the agent's cognitive state. Such internal anchors link 
the  interpretation  of  one  discourse  referent  x  in  one representation  R, to  the  inter- 
pretation  of  another discourse referent  y in  another representation Rz; more precisely, 
we say that a pair of  assignments f, g satisfies R, and RZ respectively  given an internal 
anchor between x and y iff f(x) = g(y). Unlike the value loading accounts, this approach 
focuses on the cognitive aspect of these contextual anchorings. 
DRT approaches also give us an anaphoric account of  presuppositions. Roughly, a 
definite  description  introduces  a  presuppositional  component  into  the  discourse 
representation in which a discourse referent is introduced along with the properties that 
are given  by  the  description.  This  discourse  referent  must be  linked  to  some other 
discourse referent in the context, unless the presupposition is to be accommodated. We 
can now postulate that the discourse referent introduced by presupposition generated by 
the deictically used definite binds via an internal  anchor to some discourse referent in 
the interpreter's cognitive state. Nevertheless, a DRT approach says little about the sort 
of knowing how that we've  seen is important in the examples. The uses of  definites in 
these  dialogues establish  that  it's  the  cognitive  access  for certain  purposes  that  are 
crucial  for de re  attitude  claim.  Like  Kaplan's  own  picture  of  de  re  knowledge in 
quantifying in, DRT's conception of  internal anchoring lacks any tie to practical plans; 
in fact there aren't  any constraints  on  internal  anchors whatsover,  which  might well Nicholas Asher 
accord  with  our intuitions  about  beliefs  of  a certain  kind  (footnote Jeshion  here) but 
which doesn't capture the particular sense of  de re attitude at issue here. The proposal 
I've just developed as it stands is still just binding, albeit to a belief context rather than a 
discourse context. We need some story here of  familiarity that goes beyond binding. We 
need an account in which, e.g., the variable associated with Isabelle's location is linked 
to  some cognitively  accessible  discourse  referent  in  a  way  that  allows  Phillippe  to 
accomplish his conversational goals. 
Let's see how this might be cashed out in terms of  the examples in the dialogues. 
The thesis about de re knowledge claims goes hand in  hand with a goal relative notion 
of  contextual  anchoring. Fleshing out this idea is what I turn  to  now. I'll  elaborate a 
theory of  presupposition  and of  the logical form of presupposition triggers (though not 
too much hangs on  this)  which allows a wide variety of  presupposition  bindings. I'll 
also  say  something  about  how  this  account  interacts  with  a  theory  of  cognitive 
modelling. I'll then return to these contextual anchorings. 
4.  SDRT's account of presupposition 
I turn  now to see how to analyze anchoring uses of definites within the anaphoric ac- 
count of presuppositions of  Asher and Lascarides (1998a,  1998b). I nee, however, to 
give a few more details of  the account than  I did earlier. In  this account presupposi- 
tions  are, like assertions,  units  of  information that  must  be  integrated  into  the dis- 
course context. A unit of  information, however, can be integrated into the discourse 
context  in  different ways, ways  which  correspond to the rhetorical  function of that 
unit of information. Accordingly this leads us to a more complex notion of a discourse 
structure than that present say in DRT. A discourse structure is a pair (A, F), where: 
A is a set of labels 
@  is  a  set  of  formulas  representing  clauses  and  relations  on  labels  (between 
clauses) 
F:A+@ 
We'll express the effects of F on A via the notation n:  K. 
While both assertions and presuppositions must be integrated to the discourse con- 
text, presuppositions must be linked via particular discourse relations. Asher and Las- 
carides (1998b) isolated two, Background and Defeasible Consequence. While there is 
no accommodation per se in this framework since the attachment of presuppositions 
is just part and parcel of building a discourse structure, the cases of accommodation in 
the literature correspond to linking the presupposition via the relation of Background. 
Defeasible  Consequence  generalizes  the  propositional  binding  relation  in  van  der 
Sandt and Geurts, while Background imposes thematic constraints that the notion of 
accommodation lacks. Background(p, q) holds iff q and p entail a common topic and q 
specifies properties of  elements in p that set the stage for or serve as an explanation 
for some event described in p or in some proposition linked top  (#q). 
As  discussed  in  the  introduction,  presuppositions  are  understood  as  containing 
incomplete or underspecified elements. This is particularly true in the case of the pre- 
suppositions of definites. In discussing earlier examples, I alluded to an innovation of 
the SDRT view that incorporates an underspecified bridging relation B in the presup- Deixis, Binding and Presupposition 
position  of  a definite. The representations of  presuppositions  underspecify the dis- 
course relation by which they attach to the discourse context and the other term of  that 
relation;  as  such  they  are  explicitly  anaphoric elements  whose  proper  interpretation 
must  resolve  all  of  these underspecifications - i.e. find appropriate specifications for 
these underspecifications. 
Here's  an example of  how a presupposition and an assertion would be analyzed in 
SDRT. The asserted component is labelled with  a,  the presupposed  part  with p. The 
asserted part produces a labelled SDRS for for the asserted content of  a clause; another 
SDRS -  viz.(l I b), the "p"  part -  with speech act discourse referent a', and condition a' : 
K,  for the presupposed  content of  this clause, where  K,,  will  be  the DRS discourse 
constituent that represents the presupposition. 
(1 1)  The man walked. 
walk(e,  x)  1  :  hoe  )  1  p' 
n',  R,  v 
x,  u, e', t',  B 
We', x,  u) 
hold(er, t'), 
B=? 
In  the SDRS above, the man denoted by  the definite must be  (bridging) related to an 
antecedent  object  (so  (11)  couldn't  be  uttered  in  a  null  context).  Further,  the 
presupposition  must  be  bound  to  the  context  via  a  rhetorical  relation.  While  both 
presuppositions  and  assertions  must  get  integrated  into  the  context,  they  do so in 
different  ways.  Presuppositions  link typically  with  either Defeasible  Consequence or 
Background.  We'll  add  here  the  relation  of  Anchoring  as  another  relation  that 
presuppositions  can  bear  to  other  elements  in  the  discourse  structure.  When  the 
components above are attached to the discourse context and the various specifications 
of underspecified conditions are effected (as far as possible), then we have an update of 
the  discourse  context  with  the  information  given  by  (I I).  Following  Asher  and 
Lascarides  (1998b),  I'll  represent  update  by  a  three  place  relation  involving  the 
discourse context, the new information and a "resulting"  SDRS that integrates the new 
information into the discourse context. 
In the introduction, I also mentioned that SDRT incorporates a principle of resolving 
B  to  identity  whenever  feasible, thus  capturing  the  preference  for binding  that  is  a 
feature  anaphoric  theories  of  presupposition.  This  accounts  for the  simple  cases of 
binding in 
(12)  Whenever I see a book in a bookstore that I like, 1  try to buy the book. 
We can formalize this principle as follows: Nicholas Asher 
If  Possible Use Identity: 
(KO  [B =?I A J  update(^, K, KD  [B/LA~X  = ~1))  +  (T, a, j [B//Lwayx = ~1) 
This  constraint  says that  as  long as setting the  bridging  relation  to  identity  is  well 
defined J, then the update of the discourse context with K fi will set B to identity. 
As  we saw in  (1) or  (2), sometimes we  cannot resolve  B to  identity. In  that case 
whathappens?  When  we  try  to  resolve  the  bridging  relation  to  something other than 
identity, we do so in a way  that  maximizes dis-course coherence. Since the update 
relation  is  nondeterministic,  there  are  often  many  ways  new  information  can  be 
integrated  into  a  discourse  con- text.  Sometimes  the  resolution  of  underspecified 
elements as in  (1) will  determine how the new  information attaches to  the discourse 
context.  Some  of  these  ways  provide  for  a  more  coherent  discourse  than  not. 
Attachment  and  resolution  of  underspecified  elements  always  tries  to  maximize 
discourse coherence. And to give this constraint some bite, I specify some things about 
the preference order + on discourse structures: 
More  specified,  well  typed  SDRSs  are  always  preferred  to  SDRSs  with  less 
specification - z  +*  z' -. z' > z  . 
SDRSs that violate type restrictions are less preferred than those that don't violate 
such restrictions. 
defeasible consequence > background for presupposed material 
background with a more specific topic + background with a less specific topic. 
where  speech  act  related  goals  or  SARGs can  be  inferred  from  Cognitive 
Modeling, a discourse structure that is more likely to lead to SARG satisfaction 
is more coherent than one that is not likely to lead to SARG satisfaction. 
All of  these constraints on > require probably more explanation than  I can give here. 
The first constraint just  says that if  an SDRS with fewer underspecifications where no 
type constraints on predicates are violated is to be preferred to an underspecified SDRS. 
The second constraint says that anytime a type restriction  is violated that SDRS is less 
preferred to other SDRSs where the type restriction is not violated. The third constraint 
says  that  some  discourse relations  between  presupposed  material  and  the  discourse 
context like defeasible consequence are to be preferred  over a relation  of  background 
between  the  presupposed  material  and  the  discourse  context  (thus  encoding  an 
anaphoric theory of presupposition's preference for binding over accommodation). The 
fourth  constraint  tells  us  that  the  tighter  the  connection  between  the  background 
rnaterial and the foreground material, the better the discourse coherence between those 
two segments, as a tighter connection between background and foreground will allow 
for  a  narrower,  or  more  specific,  topic.  Thus,  in  an  example  like  (1)  maximizing 
discourse coherence or MDC will prefer those SDRSs where the bridging relation in the 
presupposition of the definite is set to some relation other than identity since setting the 
relation  to  identity would require  the identification of  a couple with  a woman, which 
violates type restrictions. But further setting the bridging relation to be "a  member of' is 
preferred on several counts: it specifies the underspecified relation and it also gives rise 
to a Background relation  with a more specific topic than would be otherwise possible. 
For the inferential binding cases like (4),  MDC will specify the bridging relation to the Deixis, Binding and Presupposition 
witness  relation  as  we  described  earlier,  because  that  will  allow  us  to  attach  the 
presupposition  with the relation  of defeasible consequence to the SDRS consisting of 
the  first  two  sentences  of  (4),  and  that  is  preferred  to  any  option  on  which  the 
presupposition  is  not  so  attached. Below  I  give  a picture  of  how  the  specifications 
would go. Def-cons is the relation of Defeasible Consequence, Commentary is another 
relation  in  which  the  speaker of  the second constituent expresses an  attitude toward 
some element in the first constituent. 
That leaves our last constraint on > for discussion It has to do with cognitive modelling, 
the part of our story that I turn to next. 
(13) 
4.1.  Cognitive Modeling 
x  %I>  n< 
Def-cons(n, n,,) 
Commentary(n, no 
u = Ed  donkey1 
owns(x,  jj 
n~ :  K4, 
As we've seen anchoring requires linking an epistemic attitude to conversational goals. 
Thus, we need to be able to infer conversational goals from conversational patterns. In 
other work  (Asher and Lascarides  1998, Asher  1999), Lascarides and I have co opted 
some of  the insights  of  Gricean pragmatics and  speech  act theory to link  speech  act 
related  goals or SARGs to discourse structure. On our view, the rhetorical relations in 
dialogue bring considerations about why participants ask, elaborate, request, assert and 
respond  to  what  is  said. In  turn  such  SARGs  help  elucidate  and  further  constrain 
discourse structure. In  order to formulate a precise  notion  of  anchoring for deictically 
used  definites,  I  will  give  some  of  the  principles  for  discovering  SARGs  in  that 
component of SDRT that supplies a rough cognitive model of discourse participants. 
A second feature of  anchoring is that  once the anchoring function of  a deictically 
used definite is accepted by the interpreter, it appears that speaker and hearer mutually 
believe that the definite picks out the same object. Given that we have adopted a largely 
internalist view  of  the de re  attitude involved in  anchoring and that the way dynamic 
semantics models attitudes has nothing to say about knowing how, I'll  show how such 
mutual  belief can be derived from axioms having to do with the beliefs of  the partici- 
pants. 
Cognitive modelling in SDRT follows the basic BDI approach in which we have mo- 
dal operators for belief (K45) (B) and intention  (I)  (KD)s, and a mutual belief operator 
MBG, for any group G with  the usual  axiomatization.We'll assume distributivity of  B 
and I over  >,  as  well  as  the  K  axiom. I'll  suppose that  BApn,  corresponds  to  A 
believing the proposition  content represented in  the SDRS K,.  It is assumed in  SDRT 
that  whenever  an agent  intends  something, he does not already believe that it is true: Nicholas Asher 
IA,-  ~BA~.  Goals are propositions that one intends (a simplification but good enough 
for our purposes here). I'll  start with the simple Grice like axioms for belief modelling. 
The first axiom allows us to infer beliefs from assertions. 
Sincerity: R(a, P) > BelAgmttB,R(a,  PJ 
A second default, competence, transfers the beliefs of  one agent to another, while the 
constraint  on  acceptance gets us from acceptances to beliefs about  what  others have 
said. 
Competence: BA@  > BB@ 
Constraint on  Acceptance: Accepts(a, fi)  > MB,A.~~~~(~~cx 
Let's now  turn to the inference of  SARGs. Inferences concerning SARGs also revolve 
around a Gricean notion of cooperativity. One agent B is cooperative with another agent 
A if  he adopts A's  goals. According to this, B will try to realize A's  goals in  so doing 
help  A.  This  can  be  only  a default, because there  may  be  many  times  when  B  has 
conflicting goals with respect to A. So, a second level to cooperativity is to indicate if 
the  speaker  does  not  share  the  conversational  goals  of  the  other  participant.  These 
principles are expressed by the following axiom: 
Cooperativity: 
(a) 6(@)  > h(@) 
(b) d(@) A  4(@O)  > MA?/B(@) 
Cooperativity doesn't tell us what an agent's goals might be in dialogue, because it may 
not  be  possible to  infer an agent's  goals from what he  says. This is where particular 
linguistic axioms like QRG and RRG come in. 
Question Related Goals (QRG): 
QAP(a, P) > (48entta~&tgm,,a,P) 
This  axiom  states:  if  P is the  answer to the question  a  then  normally  the  agent or 
speaker of  ff  intends to  be  in  a certain  state in  which  P  is  true.  This axiom  applies 
whenever an agent asks a question. A similar axiom holds for requests. 
Request Related Goals (RRG): 
a : ! > LI~.,,,~(~)U 
SARGs  for  assertions  are  more  difficult  to  capture.  We'll  assume  that  knowledge 
relevant to connecting the content of assertions, which we'll  assume here to be sincere, 
to  their  conventionally  associated  SARGs can  be  accessed  by  the  linguistic  system. 
Finally, we'll  assume that if  we compute a SARG via Cooperativity or RRG or QRG, 
then if  the agent's speech act has both a presuppositional  and an assertional component, 
the SARG computed applies to both. 
One final  matter  is  that  in  SDRT questions  can  elaborate  on  other  questions  or 
requests.  We see  this  in  (8b) already  where  Phillippe's  question  is  intended to help Deixis, Binding and Presupposition 
elaborate  a  plan  already  implicit  in  Isabelle's  opening  (8a). We  call  the  rhetorical 
relation  that  (Sb) stands in to  (8a)  Question Elaboration or QElab (see Asher  1999, 
Asher  and  Lascarides  1998~).  If  we have  a  Qelab, then  the  SARGs of  the  second 
question include the SARGs of the first. Formally. we express this as: 
SARG additivity: 
(Q-elab(a, b) A SARG(c(, 6)) 4  sARG(~,  6) 
This  ensures  that  Qelab  SARGs are  carried  along  as  discourse  participants  try  to 
answer the original question by asking other questions. We'll group the SARGs that are 
accumulated through nested Qelabs within a cluster. 
5.  Conversational Goals and De Re Attitudes 
We have  most  of  the  parts  in  place  for our presuppositional  account  of  contextual 
anchoring. We needed an  account of conversational goals, and we have just  seen ways 
of  getting  SARGs  from  various  conversational  moves.We  determined  earlier  from 
looking at our examples that these conversational goals were essential in  determining 
the de re attitudes that are part of contextual anchoring. Further, I argued that these de re 
attitudes were really grounded not in  an attitude toward a proposition but in an ability. 
I'll  try  to be  more precise about  what  this  ability consists in  now  using the devices 
available to a  theory  like SDRT. That  means  giving  some analysis of  this  practical 
capacity in terms of a broadly DRIheoretic account of belief. 
Let's  return first to the turn  (Eef). Isabelle first corrects her previous turn  and then 
tries to answer Phillippe's question in (8b). Isabelle uses a deictically used definite, 'the 
end  of  the  avenue  ~ean  ~anrts'  in  her  answer,  that  Isabelle  further  localizes  with 
reference to  'the big square' (la grande place). What is the discourse relation  between 
the  presupposition  of  the  definite  and  the  discourse  context?  Presumably,  the 
presupposition  is to anchor the assertion. Interestingly, Isabelle goes on to elaborate on 
this location where she is, and the point of this elaboration in (8e.ii) is ostensibly to help 
establish  the  Anchoring  relation  between  the  presupposition  of  the  definite  and the 
discourse context. 
To appreciate  the  cognitive  effects  of  Anchoring,  let's  see  what  happens  if  the 
discourse move by  Isabelle which  includes the anchoring is accepted by  Phillippe. If 
this  Anchoring  relation  is  accepted  by  Phillippe,  it  has  a  certain  implication:  that 
Phillippe  will  be  able  to  determine  which  location  Isabelle  describes.  Moreover, 
Phillippe's  knowing  where  Isabelle  is  is  the  SARG derived from (8b) via QRG. By 
SARG additivity this remains a SARG through  (8d).'  By Cooperativity Isabelle takes 
over this SARG and she is trying to satisfy that SARG with her utterance of (8e). Were 
(8e) to be accepted, she would have satisfied that SARG and perhaps also the associated 
SARG of  getting her unlost. In  (89, however, Phillippe doesn't accept the Anchoring 
relation, which is why he asks "Wait a minute, I don't quite see where you are." 
So accepting  an  Anchoring  relation  between  the  presupposition  introduced  by  a 
definite  y  and  some  element  in  the  discourse  context  by  an  agent  A  requires  a 
'  Actually,  in  SDRT theoretic  terms, (8d) attaches to (8h) via Question Elaboration or Q-elab, which 
automatically propagates the SARG  of the first question forward, hut I'll gloss over the details of this 
par1 of the discourse structure here. Nicholas Asher 
computable means of  getting to the referent of  from the present  here and now, the 
present  nonlinguistic  context of  utterance, for some given  purpose  cp.  To this end, I 
define  a  Path  relation  on  discourse  referents  x,  which  is  introduced  by  the 
presuppositional  component of the definite's  DRtheoretic lexical entry and  u,, .,,,  un 
relative to a SARG q  and its associated cluster, P,  (A, x, UI, . . ., u,).  This relation holds 
iff 
ul, ..., LL,,  are accessible in  A's belief state and some of the ul, ...,  u,  are externally 
anchored to distinguishable objects in the present context (e.g., the here and now). 
there is a collection  of  formulas T (ul, ..., u,  ) characterizing correct beliefs of A 
concerning u,,  . . ., u, such that A has a proof from T (ul, .  . ., u,  ) that cp. 
Thus  Anchoring  as  a  discourse  relation  between  a  presupposition  introduced  by  a 
definite and some other element in  the discourse context in the SDRS for an  agent A 
entails that  the  Agent  can  satisfy a current  SARG that  he  has.  The connection  to a 
particular  de re  attitude  grounded  in  an  ability  comes  about  because  in  many,  and 
perhaps in all cases, the SARG that needs to be satisfied specifies a de re attitude (as in 
our dialogue examples)  or requires  for its satisfaction a  de  re  attitude that  is  itself 
grounded in an ability. That is, satisfying a SARG may often involve a practical  ability 
in  addition to beliefs towards attitudes. 
Spelling out the entailment without specifying the SARG further seems difficult. On 
the  other  hand,  in  the  case  of  knowledge  where,  which  is  what  is  at  issue  in  the 
examples culled from the dialogues (8) and (lo), we can be more specific. In such cases 
the path formula could plausibly involve a sequence of locations 1,  ...  I,,,  such that T and 
I, have the following features: 
formulas  of  the  form  C(l,, l,,~) for  1  5  i  5  n,  where  C  is  the  relation  of 
Connectedness. 
T determines distance and orientation information for each I, and with respect to I,.) 
and 1,+1  and 
the initial location 11 is an accissible point in the present non-linguist context. 
The idea is that if  the dialogue agent whose SDRS contains an Anchoring relation  and 
the associated goal is knowing where someone is, then the agent should be in posses- 
sion of  information  that  will  allow him  to compute  a path, a sequence of  connected 
locations that will get him from his present surroundings to the location denoted by the 
definite. Or if  the SARG is a slightly more complex type of knowing where -  say the 
goal is to know where something a is relative to some other location 1,  then the agent 
must be in possession of a path from the location of a to 1. 
With  this  in  mind,  let's  once again  go back  to the  exchange  in  (8ef). Phillippe 
doesn't accept the Anchoring relation. Why? Well, it's manifestly because even though 
Phillippe presumably knows what the end of  ave. Jean Jaurks is, he doesn't know where 
she is. In this case the demands of his SARG to know where she is, can only be satisfied 
if  he can bind the definite to a spatially determinable object from the present context - 
i.e. have his belief structure satisfy a path condition between where Isabelle is and his 
current context, or perhaps where  she needs to go. As his response makes evident, he 
cannot. Deixis, Binding and Presupposition 
Other examples from our dialogues bear out the usefulness of thinking in terms of T as 
determining a path.  In  (10) speaker A uses definites that  he can  link to elements in 
hisenvironment  and intends to have B link to elements in  his immediate context (the 
map). A has presumably already linked the discourse referents  via a Path condition. B 
stops  the  flow  of  instructions  when  he  cannot  determine  a  Path  relation.  The Path 
condition is really a constraint on a dialogue agent's attitudes. Path binding is a type of 
internal anchor in  DRT. But what is distinctive about it is its link to practical  activities 
as defined by the discourse and by SARGs. 
6.  Contextual Anchoring as Discourse Function 
We have now seen how Anchoring as a discourse function has entailments concerning 
de re abilities. What remains to be done is to specify how we might infer Anchoring as 
a  discourse  relation  and  to  specify  formally  the  relationship  between  the  discourse 
structure and the  cognitive  constraints.  This  will  be  done through  a pair  of  axioms 
written in the SDRT format. 
Like  other  discourse  relations,  Anchoring  can  also  specify  the  underspecified 
bridging relation in the presupposed information. Given our informal analysis, we might 
think  that Anchoring should somehow specify the bridging relation  to a path relation. 
Here as with inferential  binding, there is a downward flow from the global  discourse 
structure and  its  associated  cognitive  model  to  resolving  certain  underspecifications 
needed in  the binding of presuppositions. 
In those examples of inferential binding, however, the bridging relation cannot be set 
to identity without violating type restrictions. Here the situation appears to be different. 
Consider  the  exchange  in  (8gh). Isabelle  tentatively  accepts  (8g).  She uses  a  Path 
condition  to bind the railroad  tracks to something in her immediate surroundings. The 
path  sequence has length  I, and she has information  about the direction and distance 
that makes it more likely that her current SARGs will be satisfied: the SARGs are that 
Phillippe know whether Isabelle has passed under the railroad tracks (inferred via QRG 
as  a  SARG for Phillippe  and  then  as  a  SARG for Isabelle  via  Cooperativity),  that 
Phillippe  know  where  Isabelle  is and that  Isabelle find her  way  (inferred  via  QRG, 
Cooperativity, SARG additivity). But she's not sure, so she tells Phillippe what the head 
of the Path sequence is in (8h). 
Now  how  does  the  Path  condition  interact  with  the specification  of  the  bridging 
relation? Given the instructions given earlier by  Phillippe to Isabelle, it's easy enough 
for Isabelle to set the bridging relation to identity. This would be sufficient to bind the 
presupposition via Background to the asserted constituent or to Background's topic. But 
this  won't  achieve Phillippe's  SARG, which  is determined by  his question -  namely, 
this is the SARG of  knowing whether Isabelle passed under the railroad tracks he told 
her about. Further, we can assume that Isabelle also has the SARGthat Phillippe know 
whether  she  went  under  the  railroad  tracks  or  not.  This  follows  from  QRG  and 
Cooperativity: QRG tells us that Phillippe has as a SARGthat he know the answer to his 
question; Cooperativity transfers this SARG from Phillippe to Isabelle. 
In  order to  satisfy  this  common  SARG, Isabelle  has  to  do two  things;  she does 
indeed  have  to  link  the  railroad  tracks  mentioned  to  those  given  in  Phillippe's 
instructions, and  she has  to  bind  the  location  of  that  bridge  to  some location  in  her 
journey  or where she is now. And if  this analysis is right, then  we need both to have 
Anchoring determine a Path  condition  while  also allowing  in  the  relevant  cases the bridging relation to be set to identity. This would result in the most coherent discourse 
structure according to MDC because it leads to a satisfaction of  a given SARG and it is 
also the one mandated by  If  Possible Use Identity. So it  appears that whenever setting 
the bridging relation to a Path relation  would help achieve some recognizable SARG, 
we infer Anchoring as a discourse relation; and in  turn Anchoring then determines the 
existence of a Path condition relation. But an inference to an Anchoring relation doesn't 
clash  with  the  principle  of  setting  the  bridging  relation  to  identity  If  Possible  Use 
Identity; rather it complements it. 
I have formalized this using the underlying nonmonotonic logic of  SDRT. We infer 
Anchoring by default whenever resolving B to a path relation would normally allow the 
agents  involved  to see  to  it  that  (formalized  via  the  operator  stit) their  SARGs are 
realized. Below we use  [B = ?I@) to mean  that Kp has the underspecified conditions 
B = '?. 
Anchoring: 
((5  a,  p) A Sarg(P, Q) A [B =?I  (P)  A (Kg [B -re Pgl +  0  stit(agent (P), $1))  > 
Anchor(a, P) 
Constraint on  Anchoring: 
(Anchor (a,  P) A tB (x, y)I(P) A Sarg(a, PI) + 
(K,  A KO A (BA  Anchor(a, P) 4  [v'l  Path#(a,  x, v')])) 
The constraint on anchoring says that an anchoring relation entails that its terms must be 
true  propositions  and  further  that  if  an  agent  believes  Anchor(a;  P), then  the Path 
condition must be satisfied by  agent A. Let's  now see how this axiom works. Let's go 
back to (8g) and its context once again. Isabelle first processes Phillippe's question. She 
isolates out the presupposition  of  the definite la voie ,ferric  in a constituent Kc,,,,, and 
the assertion K,,ii. Given what we have said earlier about cooperativity, she attemptsto 
cooperate with Phillippe's SARG  of knowing the answer to this question and she does 
her best to tell him. But in order to give him an answer, she has to be able to anchor the 
presupposition and thus satisfy a Path condition linking the bridge to some element in 
her trajectory, which  I assume can be reconstructed from her here and now, or in  her 
here  and  now itself.  So Isabelle's  SDRS looks something like this, if  we  ignore the 
processing of definites like Phillippe and you and the manner adverbial clause: 
In  the above, v is the discourse referent for the railroad tracks introduced in Phillippe's 
previous  instructions  and  one  that  is  presumably  now  cognitively  accessible  in 
Isabelle's cognitive state The bridging relation has been set to identity between x and v. 
u is some discourse referent in Isabelle's cognitive state that is an internally anchor for 
the presupposed material. And it is in virtue of u that the Path condition is satisfied. Deixis, Binding and Presupposition 
But Isabelle is not sure whether the Path condition has been satisfied. So she attempts to 
clarify or elaborate on  what the putative Path condition is that she has found for x. In 
SDRT we  model  this rhetorical  function by  attaching (8g) to ne.ii,,  with  the discourse 
relation Elaboration  (for details on  this relation see Ashes  1993, Lascarides and Asher 
1993). This  Elaboration  also  constitutes  an  indirect  answer  (Asher  and  Lascarides 
199%) to the question in  R e.ii , and it is precisely this Elaboration and indirect answer 
that Phillippe rejects in (8h). 
Let's see how our approach fares with discourse initial deictic definites. Consider the 
initial turn (IOa) where A mentions the tribal settlement. Here there is presumably no 
discourse referent already introduced in the discourse that could serve as a link, and so 
resolving the bridging relation to identity in  this case is not possible. We'll assume that 
B  is  able to anchor  the  presupposition  generated  by  the  extinct  volcano, but  as  his 
question demonstrates, he is not able presumably to determine a Path condition for the 
discourse referent x introduced by  the tribal settlement. So presumably the question in 
(lob) is intended to help get an appropriate Path condition for x and once that question 
is  answered B can  anchor the presupposition to the asserted content of (10a). In  this 
case since 'If Possible Use Identity' because this axiom cannot he used, MDC resolves 
the Bridging relation to the Path condition, once the Anchor relation is established. 
7.  From Acknowledging Path Binding to Mutual Belief 
A final  element  in the  analysis  of  anchoring is to  account for the fact that  when  an 
Anchoring  function  has  been  acknowledged, the two participants  in the  conversation 
have  the  mutual  belief  that  the Path  relations  link to the same  location. This comes 
about after the interpreter accepts an  Anchoring relation proferred by  the speaker; this 
means that the Path condition is satisfied not only by  the speaker but the interpreter as 
well. Because the Path relation must be satisfied by  both the speaker's and the hearer's 
beliefs if  Anchoring, we say that Anchoring is a kind of coordination. 
How do we acquire mutual belief in communication? Due to Fisher (1988) we know 
that if  communication  is synchronous, then mutual belief can be had. Suppose there is 
enough simultanous exchange of  information to have it qualify as synchronous. This is 
in  fact encoded  in our constraint on  agreement: a signal  of  agreement to a previous 
contribution  in which  a discourse structure like Anchoring holds  gets  us to a mutual 
belief that the presupposed material is serving as an Anchor. Now consider any of 
the  conversational  turns  where  an  Anchoring relation  is  proposed  and then  accepted 
(e.g.,  1 Ocd). 
(10)  c.  A:  It's at the bottom. It's to the left of the a e extinct volcano. 
d.  B:  Right. How far? 
By  sincerity we  have  that  A  attaches the presupposed material  given  by  the extinct 
iiolcuno with  Anchoring to his  turn. By  signaling  an  agreement with Right B  also 
adopts this discourse structure for A's turn. We can now conclude given our assump- 
tions that there is  mutual  belief  in this discourse structure (and that  if  you  will  we 
have that discourse structure in the common ground). But now how to we get to that 
mutual belief that both path bindings link to the same object? How do we even repre- 
sent this fact? We can relatively easily answer the latter question: among the beliefs of 
a dialogue agent A  are also beliefs about other dialogue participants-let's  say for the moment just  B. Given that there is a shared belief that both participants have a path 
binding (from Anchoring), A can internally anchor the last discourse referent u of B's 
Path condition as in Asher (1986) or more recent work of  Kamp. Here I'm going to 
use the older notation and represent internal anchors as equalities within the embed- 
ded belief context. So we'll represent this internal anchoring for A as an equality x~  = 
x,~  in A's representation of B's belief  state and similarly for B. In  effect this says that 
B's beliefs about xs are also in effect a belief about A's individual concept. 
We'll suppose that Anchoring has been proposed and accepted as in (IOcd). So it's 
~nutually  believed that each agent's cognitive state satisfies the Path condition for the 
discourse referent introduced by the presupposition of the definite. This means: 
AssumeA represents B's cognitive state as having a formula $(x")  in it for the 
definite while his own has $'(x~). 
By competence we have B,(BR$(xB)  > BA$(xB). 
By distributivity of belief over > and DMP: BABB$(x8),  which then in K45 yields 
B,$(xH),  and so by K 
BA($(xB)  A P(xn)). 
And since 4 entails a uniqueness clause, first order logic yields: 
Since this is derived from mutually believed information, B can pursue the same 
reasoning and reason that A has also done this reasoning. Hence by our jump to 
the mutual belief axiom, we get 
That seems to me to suffice for internal anchoring however it's  represented. Notice 
that postulating this equality in A's belief state leads to no binding problems because 
A supposes through competence that there is an x~ of which B  has his beliefs. 
8.  Conclusions 
I've shown that a discourse based, anaphoric theory of presupposition has an interesting 
stol-y to  tell  about  at  least  some  deictic  uses  of  definites.  In  lnany  of  these  uses 
presuppositions  are  anaphorically  bound  to  the  discourse  context  via  a  particular 
discourse relation, Anchoring, whose semantics and conversational function is directly 
linked to the participant's  conversational goals. Anchoring entails a de re attitude, but it 
is one that is linked to an increased capacity for satisfying at least some conversational 
goals. Our investigation has confirmed the view that de re attitudes involve some sort of 
knowing how. We have seen how Anchoring, when  accepted by  all participants, leads 
to a mutual belief in coordinated reference -  viz. that all the particpants are referring to Deixis, Binding and Presupposition 
the same thing and can single it out at least insofar as that's required for conversational 
purposes. SDRT gave us the framework within which to analyze the discourse function 
of these uses of definites, and the modest set of defaults that SDRT  uses in developing a 
theory  of  conversational  goals  or SARGs was  helpful  in  deducing  SARGs for the 
Anchoring analysis. 
Further  tasks:  Presumably  definites  outside  the  context  of  spatial  localization 
dialogues can also be Anchored. So one idea for further research is to see how to extend 
this analysis to other definites -  deictically used pronouns and the like. Moreover, it 
seems that  almost all  words  have presupposition  like  associated  information  whose 
failure to be anchored (bound) lead to similar corrections as those we've studied here. 
Consider these metalinguistic bits of anchoring information in the examples below due 
to Ginzburg that are called into question by B's responses. 
(14)  a.  A:  John kowtowed. 
b.  B:  Kowtowed? 
(15)  a.  A:  Chris inebriated Pat. 
b.  B:  Inebriated? 
9  References 
Asher, N. (1986) Belief in Discourse Representation Theory, Journal of Philosophical Logic 15, 
127-189.. 
Asher, N. (1993) Reference to Abstract Objects in Discourse, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Asher, N., J. Busquets and A. Le Draoulec (2001) Cooperativity  in  Dialogue, in edd. Bras, M 
and L. Vieu Semantics and Pragmatic Issues in Discourse and Dialogue, Current Research 
in the Semantics/Pragmatics Interface, Elsevier Publishers, 217246. 
Asher, N. and A. Lascarides (1 998a) Bridging, Journal of Semantics, IS. I, 83-1 13. 
Asher, N. and A. Lascarides (1 998b) The Semantics and Pragmatics of Pre-supposition, Journal 
of Semantics, 15, 239-299. 
Asher,  N. and  M. Morreau.  (1991) Common  Sense Entailment:  A  Modal  Theory  of  Non- 
monotonic Reasoning, in Proceedings to the 12thInternational Joint Conference on Artifi- 
cial Intelligence, Sydney Australia, August 199  1. 
Barwise, J. and J. Perry (1983) Situations and Attitudes, MIT Press. 
Boer, S. and W. Lycan (1986) Knowing Who, MIT Press. 
Fisher, J. (1988) Common Knowledge and Synchronous Communication, ed. Y. Moses, Pro- 
ceedings of the Conference on Theoretical Aspects of  Reasoning about Knowledge. 
Geurts, B. (1 995) Presupposing, PhD. dissertation, Universitat Stuttgart. 
Heim, I. (1982) The Semantics of Definite and Indefinite Noun Phrases, PhD thesis, University 
of Massachussetts, Amherst. 
Heim, I. (1983) On the Projection Problem of  Presuppositions, Proceedings of the West Coast 
Conference on Formal Linguistics, 2, 114-126. 
Kaplan, D. (1968) Quantifying In, Synthese 19, 178-214. 
Kaplan, D. (1978) Dthat, Syntax and Semantics 9, ed. P. Cole, 221-251. 
Lascarides, A. and N.  Asher  (1993) Temporal  Interpretation,  Discourse  Relations and Com- 
mollsense Entailment, in Linguistics and Philosophy,  16,437-493. 
van der Sandt, R. (1992) Presupposition Projection as Anaphora Resolution, Journal of Seman- 
tics,  19(4). 